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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF PRESs-MOvIE CENSORSHIP
Plaintiffs, two corporations engaged in the motion picture busi-
ness, brought this suit for judgment declaring the censorship
ordinance of Atlanta, Ga., unconstitutional under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as extended by the United
States Supreme Court to include freedom of the press. The de-
fendant admitted that the picture was barred from exhibition in
Atlanta, not because it was immoral, but because it would adversely
affect the peace of the city. Defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint, on grounds that motion pictures are not entitled to
the protection constitutionally accorded the press, was granted.
89 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ga. 1950). On appeal, held, affirmed. Motion
pictures have not emerged from the character of amusement into
instruments for the propogation of ideas; therefore, they are not
to be considered part of the press. RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F.
2d 562 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
By an anomaly of English law rigorous censorship of drama
was left unimpaired during the development of the freedom of the
press. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the theater
enjoyed a status comparable to that of the press. PAmuEn, THE
CENSOR AD THE THEATRE 20-26 (1913). In 1737 Sir Robert Walpole,
to quiet the satire of his administration in the theaters of London,
persuaded Parliament to pass a bill making mandatory the licensing
of all stage plays. 10 GEo. II c. 28 (1737). Had it not been for this
statute "the pulpit, press, and play would today be on equal foot-
ings." FOWELL AND PALMER, CENsoRsmIP IN ENGLAND 78-9 (1913).
See Note, 124 A.L.R. 236 (1939). This historical divergency was
read into American constitutional law by 1915. Mutual Film Corp.
v. Ohio Indemnity Corp., 236 U.S. 230 (1915). Speaking for a unani-
mous court, Mr. Justice McKenna declared: "It can not be put out of
view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles
not to be regarded as part of the press of the country or as organs
of public opinion." The Mutual Film doctrine has been universally
followed. Mutual Film v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915); Nahsen v.
Chicago, 271 Ill. 288, 111 N.E. 119 (1915); Mehlosu v. Milwaukee,
56 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882 (1915). See Note, 64 A.L.R. 505 (1927).
Judicial assertion that movies are not organs of public opinion,
however true in 1915, is rebutted today on every hand. It is common
knowledge that censor boards often ban films solely for their idea
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content. Kadin, Administrative Censorships A Study of the Mails,
Motion Pictures and Radio Broadcasting, 19 B. U. L. REV. 533
(1939). fllustrative is a recent Tennessee case which upheld
banning a movie because "The South doesn't recognize social
equality between the races." United Artists v. Board of Censors,
189 Tenn. 397, 225 S.W. 2d 550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 952
(1950). Of the nine motion picture censorship statutes four exempt
current event films, thereby inferring some legislative realization
of the changing character of the movie medium. KANSAs LAWS
1925, ch. 196; KAN. Gm. STAT. 1949, §51-103; N.Y. EDUCATIONAr
LAW § 1083a; PURDnO'S PA. STAT. AxN. 1941, TIT. 4 § 103; VA. CODE
AxN. 1949 § 378d. The United States Supreme Court has recognized.
the expansiveness of the conception of the press by holding that
"The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."
Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937), while the Missouri
Constitution of 1945 itself recognizes freedom of expression as
embracing every means of communication. Mo. CONST. ART. 1 § 8.
Climaxing this transition in viewpoint is the recent dictum of the
Supreme Court, "We have no doubt that motion pictures, like news-
papers and radios, are included in the press whose freedom is guar-
anteed by the First Amendment." United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly
refused to reconsider its earlier decision that motion pictures are
not within the free press guaranty. United Artists v. Board of
Censors, supra; Note, 39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939). The principal
case merely reflects this long standing attitude.
The censorship ordinance in the principal case is analogous to
the municipal ordinance invalidated in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939). That ordinance permitted local officials to refuse permits
for public meetings where they would adversely affect the
peace of the city. Constitutionality of such an ordinance had been
long established. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
Determination that these meetings were within the free speech
guaranty did not preclude all municipal restriction upon public
meetings, but rather circumscribed the area of discretion of the
local officials. In reconsidering whether movies are a part of the
constitutionally protected press, an affirmative conclusion would not
abolish state censorship, but instead would achieve a balance similar
to that worked out for public meetings on municipal property.
The area of censorship would be limited to consideration of a film's
moral aspects, thus protecting expression of ideas from the whim of
a censor's discretion, except where extreme circumstances pre-
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CONsTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOm OF SPEECH AND RELiGIoN-
SEIcTnm SERVICE ACT
A college dean was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio of counseling and encour-
aging a student in his decision to refuse to register as required by
the Selective Service Act of 1948. 62 STAT. 604, 50 U.S.C. § 462 (a).
Defendant argued that he was denied freedom of speech and re-
ligion by being deprived of his right to speak freely against acts
which were repugnant to his religious beliefs. On appeal, affirmed.
Lary Gara v. United States, 178 F. 2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949). On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, judgment
affirmed by an equally divided court without opinion. 340 U.S. 857
(1950).
Our democratic type of government requires for its own sur-
vival that persons be allowed to speak freely for or against legisla-
tion and urge action upon it. Likewise, advocacy of a doctrine
which is abhorrent to most people's ideas of religion or patriotism
cannot be made a crime. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1946);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). On the other hand, persons are
not protected when they preach for violent overthrow of the govern-
ment by force. Radical changes can, of course, be advocated, but
the rules of the game must be observed. United States v. Dennis,
183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 863 (1950).
In the principal case Judge Allen indicates that the defendant
could have spoken against the evils of this law and encouraged its
repeal from every platform in America. The action of the defendant,
however, was aimed at more than telling the world that he thought
the Selective Service Act was bad. He was attempting directly to
interfere with its operation. He did not choose to follow the general
political procedure for the elimination of bad laws, but rather he
chose to attack the law by counseling another in an attempt to
secure non-performance of the registration required by the Act.
This attack by way of speech, though not conforming to the normal
political process, could not be prohibited unless some substantial
damage to society were likely to result if such conduct continued
unrestricted. Restrictions are justified only when acts do conflict
to some considerable extent with the guaranteed rights of others.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
The basic problem of the principal case, therefore, is how great
a risk or how great an interference with the rights of others must
result before the government is justified in prohibiting acts which
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are either completed through the medium of speech or bona fide
practices of an individual's religion. In Schenck v. United States,
240 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court said, "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evil that Congress had a right to
prevent." Imminent danger of any substantive evil that Congress
may prevent seems to have been the only requirement in order to
justify the restriction of speech. Since this "clear and present
danger" test was originally unveiled it has undergone considerable
modification. It is no longer enough to say that the likelihood that
a substantive evil will result will justify restrictions on speech;
it is necessary now that the evil itself be "substantial" and "rela-
tively serious." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (con-
curring opinion by Brandeis, J.) or sometimes "extremely serious,"
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
The danger to the defense of our country which would result
from a failure to register manpower was considered by Congress
to be substantial and serious enough to warrant making counseling
against registration a separate and distinct crime. The Court appar-
ently agreed that failure to register manpower in this period in
history would be a failure to provide for the common defense. The
lack of an embryonic army would constitute a substantial evil,
serious enough to allow restriction of speech where that speech
creates a clear and present danger that such an evil is likely to
result.
Chief Justice Vinson in American Communications Associa-
tion v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), said, "When particular conduct
is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech,
the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting
interests demands the greater protection under the particular cir-
cumstances presented." The real test then of governmental power
over First Amendment situations appears to be whether the pre-
scribed acts or conduct are sufficiently injurious to the peace,
health, safety, and welfare of society generally so as to counter
balance the infringement on personal liberties inherent in every
interference by government with free speech. The side toward
which the scales will tip will depend upon speculation as to the
probable damage which is likely to result to society by the for-
bidden acts. If the guarantees of the First Amendment were to
become absolute, social anarchy would reign; if they could be lightly
brushed aside, our civil liberties might well be brushed aside with
them. So long as we have this balance concept, we shall have
somewhere across the spectrum an area of uncertainty because
1951]
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reasonable men will differ as to the weight to be accorded to the
protection of society. While one's religious beliefs remain inviolate,
the practice of those beliefs, consummated through the medium of
speech, will continue to be regulated in the interest of society.
Der D. Oberlin
CONSTiTTIONAL LAw-
STATE LEGISLATION PROHIBITING STRIKES IN PUBLIC UTILITIES
Petitioners, labor unions and their officers, called strikes to
enforce union demands against public utility employers after the
parties became unable to agree in collective bargaining proceedings.
The respondent, Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, charged
with enforcement of the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law,
Wis. STAT. §111.50 et seq. (1947), secured an ex parte order from a
state court restraining the strikes. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the action of the lower court and sustained the validity of
the statute. Held, the statute is invalid because it conflicts with the
NLRA, as amended. Amalgamated Employees of America v. Em-
ployment Relations Board and United Workers of America, C.LO. v.
Employment Relations Board, 71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951).
The Wisconsin statute prohibits strikes and lockouts where an
"impasse" has been reached by the parties in collective bargaining,
and provides for compulsory arbitration of the disputes, on the
ground that such strikes and lockouts result "in damage and injury
to the public.., and creates an emergency justifying action which
adequately protects the general welfare." Wis. STAT. §111.50 (1947).
Legislation prohibiting strikes and lockouts, often providing
for compulsory arbitration of disputes, in intrastate public utilities
where such strikes might cause injury or inconvenience to the
public has been adopted by some eleven states. N. J. STAT. ANN.
§34:13B-1 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. §453.01 (1947); Bauer, TRAus-
FORMING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 242 (1950).
Where such legislation has provided for compulsory arbitration,
it has been successfully attacked in some states as violative of state
constitutions in that the delegation of power to the administrative
agencies has not been accompanied by adequate standards. Trans-
port Workers' Union v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W. 2d 71 (1948);
State v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Federation, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A. 2d 616
(1949). Compulsory arbitration has also been held violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that it "de-
prives the employer of property" and "both the employer and
employee of liberty, without due process of law." And a temporary
emergency has been held not to justify such a violation. Dorchy v.
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Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
The principal case held the Wisconsin statute invalid, not for
either of the above mentioned reasons, but on the federalistic
grounds that by the NLRA, as amended, Congress has regulated
labor relations to the full extent of its constitutional power under
the commerce clause. By imposing restrictions only upon strikes
which might create national emergencies, the Congress has guar-
anteed the right to strike in all other situations and has thus pre-
cluded the states from any activity which might abrogate or restrict
this right Consequently the Wisconsin statute was held to be in
conflict with such federal legislation.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, voices the opinion that the
federal legislative efforts to prevent national emergencies, without
expressly providing for emergencies local in nature, does not pre-
clude state legislation designed to prevent local emergencies, and
thus there is no conflict.
The principal case raises the question as to the validity of the
Court's indulgence in the negative inference that the Congress
meant to preclude state activity by not expressly providing for it.
This field being one of concurrent jurisdiction under the "Cooley
compromise," the states are given power to regulate until pre-
empted by Congressional intent to "occupy the field." The Court,
in interpreting this intent, to determine the degree of occupancy,
has recently held that "an intention of Congress to exclude states
from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."
International Union v. Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Employment Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). But the Court also, in a similar situa-
tion, said, "Exclusion of state action by Federal legislation may be
implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter
although express declaration of such result is wanting." Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). There is
no foreseeable limitation on the use of such a "negative inference"
in restricting the powers of the states.
The result of the principal case leaves a serious problem of
regulation of strikes causing less than national emergencies, the
state being impotent to regulate and the federal government failing
to provide for such regulation. In the words of Justice Black, dis-
senting in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949),
"The gravity of striking down state regulations is immeasurably
increased when it results as here in leaving a no-man's land immune
from any effective regulation whatever."
C. William Malone
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HABEAS CoRPus-ExHAuSTION OF Rmms-PrTroN FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS A NEcESsARY STEP
Petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district
court, seeking relief from state-imposed imprisonment in violation
of his rights under the Federal Constitution. The prisoner based
his claim for relief on the fact that he was without the aid of counsel
of his own choosing and had not been provided sufficient time to
procure witnesses and prepare for his defense. The prisoner had
exhausted his state remedies, but he had failed to petition for writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held,
Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Jackson dissenting, petition for
writ of certiorari is a requisite step in the exhaustion of remedies
in the absence of "unusual circumstance." Darr v. Burford, Warden,
339 U.S. 200 (1950).
In 1867, Congress gave the federal courts jurisdiction to issue
writes of habeas corpus to petitioners held under state proceedings.
REV. STAT. §753 (1875). Because of the potential friction that might
result between state and federal judicial systems if the imposed
jurisdiction were too freely exercised, the Supreme Court of the
United States worked out a self-imposed limitation upon the discre-
tionary jurisdiction of the federal judge. This limitation required
that a petitioner exhaust all other available remedies before seeking
habeas corpus in the federal district court. Though at first the
application of the limitation was left to the discretion of the district
courts, Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); In re Woods, 140 U.S.
278 (1891), the Supreme Court soon made "exhaustion of remedies"
an absolute condition precedent to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. Ex Parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913). A vestige of the
original plenary power remained only in the cases involving "unsual
circumstances." Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886); In re Loney,
134 U.S. 372 (1890); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
By Congressional action in 1916, and again in 1925, the right to
review by the Supreme Court in state habeas corpus cases was
made dependent upon the court's discretion. 39 STAT. §726 (1916),
as amended, 43 STAT. §937 (1925); 28 U.S.C. §344 (1946). As a
result, in many of the state habeas corpus cases, certiorari would
be denied without consideration of the merits of the claim. Speck,
Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 Omo ST. L. J. 337 (1949).
This resulted not only in delay of the final disposition of the claim,
but also, in many cases, in a complete denial of relief without any
hearing on the merits of the claim by the federal district court.
This follows from the fact that the denial of certiorari, unfor-
tunately, is tacitly given weight in the consideration of the peti-
tioner's subsequent petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924). This
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effect of certiorari has not been considered by the Court. Thus in
Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), the Court affirmed the strict
exhaustion of remedies doctrine, laid down by the pre-certiorari
Court. This position was mitigated somewhat by the holding that
if the decision of the state court is based upon the conclusion that
habeas corpus is not available under the state practice, or if the
decision is based upon some adequate non-federal ground, then it is
not necessary to seek the writ of certiorari. The Court rationalized
this position by pointing out the lack of jurisdiction to review such
decisions of the state court. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
This tendency to overthrow the traditional rule requiring peti-
tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court as a step in the exhaustion
of remedies was greatly advanced in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672
(1948), which the principal case overrules. Justice Murphy con-
cluded, for the majority, that if it appears that the petition for cer-
tiorari would be futile, then it is not a requisite step in the ex-
haustion of remedies. Even if, under the circumstances, certiorari
would have been granted, the fact that it was not applied for should
only be one consideration before the district court and should not
be controlling. In reaching this conclusion Justice Murphy pointed
out the frequency of denial of certiorari in state habeas corpus
cases without consideration of the merits of the claim and the
potential prejudicial effect on subsequent proceedings of the peti-
tioner.
Although the flexible rule of Wade v. Mayo, supra, is desirable,
as stated in Moore, COMMENTARY ON THE UNrrED STATES JUDICIAL
CODE, 447-449 (1949), it was abandoned by the Court in the prin-
cipal case. In this case the majority cited the pre-certiorari cases
and read the new provisions of 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1948), in the light
of the revisor's note, which declared that the code affirmed the law
as laid down in Ex Parte Hawk, supra. However, Wade v. Mayo,
supra, decided June 14, 1948, before the enactment of the new code
on June 25, 1948, changed the existing law of Ex Parte Hawk, supra.
This was not examined by the majority of the Court in the principal
case, as they stated that the revisor's note set forth the existing law
at the time of passage of the code.
The rocky path toward freedom from state imprisonment by
means of federal habeas corpus in the absence of "unusual circum-
stances" must necessarily include a petition for the writ of certiorari
to review the decision of the court of last resort of the state which
has refused petitioner's claim for release by habeas corpus. If the
petition for certiorari is denied without a hearing on the merits of
the claim, the petitioner is subject to the probability that he will be
denied all relief without such a hearing. The inroad made upon
this doctrine by White v. Ragen, supra, still stands as one of the
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"unusual circumstances." The flexibility of the remedy as advanced
by the Wade case, supra, is reduced and petitioners, seeking this
form of relief, must comply with the traditional pre-certiorari tests
of exhaustion of remedies.
Herman J. Weber
I J NCTioNs-AmERs AND ABETTORS
The I.C.C. filed a bill to enjoin defendant from inducing and
procuring motor carriers to transport goods in interstate commerce
for compensation where such carriers have not obtained a certificate
of convenience and necessity. Held, that the jurisdiction given the
district courts by the I.C.A. extends to such an aider and abettor;
and, that the carriers are not indispensable parties to the mainte-
nance of such an action. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Blue
Diamond Products Co., 93 F. Supp. 688 (S. D. Iowa 1950).
The I.C.A. provides: "If any motor carrier or broker operates
in violation of any provision of this chapter ... the Commission...
may apply to the district court... for the enforcement of such pro-
vision... and such court shall have jurisdiction to enforce obedience
thereto by a writ of injunction. . . ." 49 STAT. 551, 552 (1935), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§306 (a), 309 (a) (1950). It has been held that
a bill to enjoin persons who are aiding and abetting the commission
of unlawful acts is proper, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Cal. 1939), even in situations
where such aiding and abetting is not itself a crime in the sense of
having a statutory penalty attached to it. West Virginia v. Adams
Express Co., 219 Fed. 794 (4th Cir. 1915). These cases appear to
afford ample support for holding that the court has jurisdiction over
the defendants in this proceeding; however, in the Timetrust and
Adams Express cases, supra, the principals were joined as de-
fendants.
All persons having a joint interest are indispensable parties to
an action; they must either be joined or the reasons for their non-
joinder pleaded. Fm. R. Civ. P. 19 (a), 19(c). When these rules
have not been complied with the courts will summarily dismiss
the action. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Knox, 326 U.S. 371
(1945). There is, however, no hard and fast rule for determining
who are indispensable parties in any given situation. In general they
are stated to be those who have such an interest that no final decree
can be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the
case in such a condition that any final determination thereof would
be inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Metropolis Theatre
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Co. v. Barkhausen, 170 F. 2d 481 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 945 (1948); Shuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1947).
By contrast, in the federal criminal law it is not even required
that there be a trial of the principal before an aidor or abettor can
be convicted. 18 U.S.C. §2 (1948); United States v. Gooding,
12 Wheat. 46 (U.S. 1827).
The principal case presented for the first time the question
whether an aider or abettor can be enjoined, without the joining of
the principal as a defendant, under the I.C.A. While the Timetrust
and Adams Express cases, supra, had indicated that the jurisdiction
conferred on the courts by the Act might well embrace one who was
inducing others to commit violations thereof, it remained for the
principal case to make that proposition into law in a clear and
unequivcal fashion. By holding that the carriers are not indis-
pensable parties to such an action the court seems to have acted as
the prior civil and criminal cases on the question of parties indi-
cated it should, though the precedents on this point do not seem as
strong as those concerning the jurisdictional question.
The court in the present case did not make any great changes
in the law. It merely applied the existing law to a novel fact situa-
tion. The result seems loth logical from a practical standpoint and
in keeping with the principles of the precedents and statutes in-
volved. The court obviated the necessity of joining parties who
are in no way necessary for the achievement of the purposes of the
Act and whose presence could serve no practical purpose.
Charles D. Shook
INSURANcE-REAL PAnTy IN INTEREST-LoAN RECEIPTS
Plaintiff sold a defective ]adder to a customer who sustained an
injury while using it. The customer sued the present plaintiff and
recovered a judgment. Plaintiff, upon signing a loan receipt, satis-
fied the judgment with money received from the insurer. Plaintiff
brought this action against the manufacturer of the defective ladder
to recover his loss. Defendant contended that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest because he sustained no damage since
the judgment was paid with funds of the plaintiff's insurer. Held,
the payment under the loan receipt constituted a complete payment
and discharge of the liability of the insurere to the plaintiff, and
therefore the plaintiff is not the real party in interest within the
meaning of Section 11241 of the Ohio General Code. Cleveland
Paint and Color Co. v. Bauer Mfg. Co., 155 Ohio St. 17, 97 N. E. 2d
545 (1951).
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The loan receipt provided, as most loan receipts do, that the
amount paid in satisfaction of the insured's liability is a loan and
not a discharge of the insurer's liability under the policy. It is repay-
able to the insurer to the extent of any recovery which is obtained
in an action which the insured agrees to bring against the party
responsible for the loss. The cost of the suit, which is under the
exclusive control and direction of the insurer, is borne by the
insurer. If there is no recovery, the insured is under no obligation
to repay the loan to the insurer.
If the loan receipt transaction is really a loan, the insured is the
real party in interest under Section 11241 which states that, "an
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in inter-
est.... ." If the payment under the loan receipt is in full satisfaction
of the insured's loss, discharging the insurer's liability under the
insurance policy, the insurer is the subrogee of the insured's claim
against the tort-feasor and is the real party in interest. Courts of
other jurisdictions have divided upon the question. Holding the
loan receipt to be a valid loan are Luchenbach v. McCahan Sugar
Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918); Sosnow, Krance, and Simcoe, Inc., v.
Storatti, 295 N.Y. 675, 65 N.E. 2d 326 (1946); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg.
Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E. 2d 146 (1944). Coxtra: American Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 2d 787, 171 P. 2d 449
(1946); Cocoa Trading Corp. v. Bayway Terminal Corp., 290 N.Y.
697, 49 N.E. 2d 6*32 (1943). See note, 157 A.L.R. 1255 (1945).
In the Luchenbach case, supra, a leading case on the question,
the policy provided that the insurer would not be liable if the
carrier was liable. The insurer paid the loss under a loan receipt
agreement. In holding it to be a valid loan, Mr. Justice Brandeis
stated that, "it is creditable to the ingenuity of business men that
an arrangement should have been devised which is consonant both
with the needs of commerce and the demands of justice."
However, cases like the Luchenbach case stand on a different
footing from the case at bar. In the former the liability of the
insurer was contingent in that it was obliged to pay on the policy
only if the carrier was not liable. The insured had a real interest
in the action because a determination that the carrier was not liable
would obligate the insured to return the money to the insurer.
There was a stronger justification for considering this a valid loan
than in the principal case where the liability of the insurer was not
conditional in any way. Here the insurer was bound to discharge
its obligation on the policy in any event. The use of the loan receipt
device in this situation is a subterfuge to disguise the real plaintiff
in the case, and to avoid any prejudices that juries may have against
insurance companies. In the principal case the court declared
that "it strains our credulity too far to treat that agreement as one
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for a loan." The court distinguished the Luchenbach case on the
difference in the nature of the liability of the insurer.
In Thompson Heating Corp. v. Hardware Indemnity Inc. Co.,
72 Ohio App. 55, 50 N.E. 2d 671 (1943), the court of appeals held
that the loan receipt agreement was a valid loan. There, however,
the liability of the lending insurer was contingent upon the validity
of another insurance policy held by the insured with the defendant
insurance company. The Supreme Court, in the case at bar, did not
specifically refer to the Thompson case, but in discussing the cases
where the liability of the insurer was contingent, said that they were
clearly distinguishable from the principal case where the insurer's
liability was absolute.
Where the insurer's liability is absolute the insurer is the real
party in interest notwithstanding the fact the payment to the insured
is clothed in the garb of a loan; but where liability is contingent,
there is a basis for a loan in fact, and it is possible the Supreme
Court would hold the insured to be the real party in interest.
Robert R. Freda
LABOR LAw-EN ORCEABLE UNION SECURI
During September, 1946 the members of Local 12 passed a
motion purporting to increase their regular monthly dues from
$1.50 to $2 with the further provision that those members who
attended each of the monthly union meetings would be exonerated
from the payment of the additional $.50.
Upon failure of employee E to attend the November, 1948,
union meeting $.50 of the $1.50 E had authorized to be checked
off of his salary each month was applied to the payment of the
non-attendance charge. For failure to pay the $.50 now owed
on the $1.50 E was suspended from union membership and, upon
request of Local 12, was discharged by his employer under a mainte-
nance of membership provision in the collective agreement.
Complaints were filed against the employer and the union for
discrimination under Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the NLRA,
as amended. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §141 et seq. (1947). Held,
that E's discharge was a violation of Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2).
The $.50 attendance charge was a fine, not dues. The check-off
authorization by E did not give the union discretion to apply the
$1.50 for other than dues. Therefore, it was the fine for non-
attendance, not regular dues, that was still owed by E; because
this fine does not come within the term "periodic dues" used in
Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (2) which permit a discharge for non-
membership in the union caused by failure to pay the "periodic
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dues," these sections have been violated. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
92 N.L.R.B. No. 171 (Dec. 29, 1950).
Section 8 (a) (3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this act or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as
a condition of employment membership therein. ... Provided fur-
ther, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for non-membership in a labor organization... (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied
or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. .. ."
Section 8 (b) (2) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization . . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection
(a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated
on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquir-
ing or retaining membership. . . ." One purpose of these sections
is to limit enforcement of union security provisions by discharge
from employment to the failure to join and/or pay the regular dues
and initiation fees. That this was the clear legislative intent is
shown by the many statements of senators during debate on these
sections. Senator Taft explained: "Under our provision in the
committee bill, the closed shop is abolished, and a man can get a
job with an employer and can continue in that job if, in effect, he
joins the union and pays the union dues." 93 ConG. REc. 4886
(1947); see also 93 CONG. REc. 4284, 4138 (1947). In the principal
case the Board explicitly recognized such to be the purpose of these
sections: ". . . it is quite evident that such a technique could readily
be utilized by unions to circumvent the provisions of Section
8 (a) (3) and render meaningless its purpose in limiting enforceable
union security to the collection only of 'the periodic dues and initia-
tion fees.'" And it carried out the purpose of these sections by
holding that although a union member is entitled, if he wishes, to
pay all financial claims against him by his union, whether or not
they are enforceable by discharge under Section 8 (a) (3), a willing-
ness to pay to the union charges other than the regular monthly
dues may not be inferred merely from a blanket check-off author-
ization or union constitutional provision.
The Board's decision, the first on the problem of using a check-
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off device to enforce, by discharge, union obligations other than the
payment of periodic dues and initiation fees, does not itself permit
such enforcement of other union obligations. However, dictum in
the decision suggests permitting this in certain situations. "There-
fore, we cannot recognize or give effect to any procedure whereby
employee payments to a union intended to be applied to regular
monthly dues are diverted to pay other union claims against the
employee unless each specific claim for purposes other than the
regular monthly dues is clearly authorized by the employee to be
checked-off his earnings... ." Thus it would seem that if E had
specifically authorized the union to apply the checked off funds to
pay his monthly dues or any other union obligation, the Board
would have held that neither the employer nor the union com-
mitted an unfair labor practice in the discharge of E. His discharge
would be viewed as one for non-union membership which resulted
from failure to pay the "periodic dues." It is apparent that such
a device would indirectly facilitate the use of a discharge to enforce
union obligations other than "periodic dues" and "initiation fees."
Use of this device, if not checked, could easily defeat this one pur-
pose of Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2).
Section 8 does not make a check-off agreement per se an unfair
labor practice whether the check-off provision does or does not
comply with Section 302 (a), (b), and (c) (4), which makes it
unlawful for any employer to pay or for any union to receive money
of an employee except for "payment of membership dues." Salant
& Salant, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 816 (1950). In general a check-off "agree-
ment constitutes a violation of the act only in those situations where
it is made with an organization that was company-dominated, or
which for some other reason did not represent an uncoerced ma-
jority of the employees." Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
319 U.S. 533 affirming 44 N.L.R.B. 404 (1943); Salant & Salant, Inc.,
supra; Bluefield Garment Mfg., 75 N.L.R.B. 447 (1947); Wingert
Contracting Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 224 (1947). While Section 8 will pro-
vide check on the device only where the union is dominated or
where the employees are coeprced, Section 302 (a), (b) and (c) (4)
could be a check on the undue expansion of this device.
The amount of check would depend upon two factors. First,
Section 302 is not self-executing. It will provide check only if the
Attorney General actively enforces it. To this date the writer finds
no cases of such enforcement. Nor is enforcement likely since
neither labor nor management are prone to alienate the other by
initiating criminal prosecution. Second, even if the Attorney Gen-
eral enforces this section, it is not clear that there would be much
check. The amount of check would depend upon the interpretation
of the term "membership dues" used in Section 302 (c) (4). If these
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words are construed narrowly, e.g., as including only "periodic dues
and initiation fees," the device suggested in the dictum of the prin-
cipal case will amount to nil since it would result in holding that
only payment, of periodic dues and initiation fees is enforceable by
discharge. If, on the other hand, "membership dues" is interpreted
more broadly than the wording of Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2),
"periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required," the sug-
gested device will aid unions by increasing the area of enforceable
union security over that permitted under Sections 8 (a) (3) and
8 (b) (2).
At present whether the interpretations of the terms "periodic
dues and initiation fees uniformly required" and "membership
dues" will or will not coincide is but a matter of conjecture. The
principal case, holding that a fine is not within the term "periodic
dues," is the first interpretation by the Board or the courts of the
former term; the latter term has been interpreted in an opinion
by the Attorney General of the United States as including initiation
fees and assessments as well as regular periodic dues. JusTIcE
DEPT. Op., 22 L.RR.M. 46 (1948). Obviously neither term has yet
been fully nor conclusively interpreted, but there is a glimmer of a
trend to interpret "membership dues" broader than "periodic dues,"
a result to be expected from the wording of the respective sections
of the Act.
To summarize, the Board has indicated receptiveness to the
use of the check-off as a means of increasing enforceable union
security. The extent to which this doctrine may develop depends
in part upon whether the Attorney General enforces Section
302 (a), (b) and (c) and, if he does, whether the term "membership
dues" is given a broader meaning than the term "periodic dues
and initiation fees uniformly required." It is unlikely that the
Attorney General will enforce Section 302 and thereby check the
suggested device. But notwithstanding the apparent lack of check
on the device any prognostication as to whether the device will aid
labor organizations or will fade into antiquity unnoticed would be
but a futile gesture since the device is but dictum in a case of first
impression. To say this does not mean the suggested device is not
worthy of careful observation. It may well be the threshold of a





NEGoTiAaLE INST ENTs-DEFENSES---REAL PARTY n INTmET-
WHEN APPmc&Lx
Plaintiff, a bank, holding a note endorsed after maturity, as
pledgee reduced same to a cognovit judgment which was vacated
pending trial of the issues joined upon petition of defendant en-
dorsers alleging (1) payment, (2) that plaintiff is not the real party
in interest, and (3) setting forth an agreement among endorsers as
to method of payment. The trial court found that the note had
been paid and rendered judgment for the defendants whereupon
the plaintiff appealed. Held, affirmed, since the plaintiff brought
its action as pledgee and also as endorsee after maturity, it is subject
to the defense that it is not the real party in interest. Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Beidler, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 146 (App. 1950).
In Ohio, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act in 1902, Omo REV. STAT. Section 3173 provided that an
endorsee after maturity was subject to any defense the defendant
might have raised against the original payee. Under this statute
these defenses were held to include equitable set-off, Baker v.
Kinsey, 41 Ohio St. 403 (1884); and that the endorsee after maturity
was not the real party in interest. Osbur, v. McClelland, 43 Ohio
St. 284, 1 N. E. 644 (1885); Kernohan v. Durham, 48 Ohio St. 1,
26 N. E. 982 (1891).
This rule is said to have been changed by the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Act so that Orno GENERAL CODE Section
8156 provides that "the holder of a note may bring an action thereon
in his own name and is not subject to the defense that he is not the
real party in interest." Wick v. Cleveland Securities Co., 71 Ohio
App. 393, 50 N. E. 2d 351 (1943).
The term "holder" means the payee or endorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it. OHno GEN. CODE §8295. Such holder is
prima facie the owner and, as such, is entitled to bring suit as the
real party in interest. Independent Coal Co. v. Bank, 6 Ohio C. C.
(N. S.) 225, 17 Ohio Cir. 297 (1905); 29 0. JuR. 1235; 10 C. J. S.
1167. The holder of a negotiable instrument transferred as collateral
security may sue thereon in his own name. Flourney v. Sprague,
214 S. W. 183 (Mo. 1919); BR wNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMNTS
LAW 666 (7th ed. Beutel, 1948); 10 C. J. S. 1177. "An action must
be prosecuted'in the name of the real party in interest.... When a
party asks that he may recover by virtue of an assignment, the
right of counterclaim, and defense, as allowed by law, shall not
be impaired." Orno GFN. CODE §11241. The test is whether the
plaintiff has a real interest in the result. Thompson Heating Corp.
v. Ins. Co., 72 Ohio App. 64, 50 N. E. 2d 671 (1943).
The court in the instant case recognizes the rule of the Wick
case, supra, but distinguishes it on the fact that the plaintiff here
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was a pledgee who took after maturity. As such it is subject to the
same defenses as if the note were non-negotiable; OaIo Gmx. CODE
§8163; including equitable set-off, Union Properties, Inc., v. Baldwin
Bros. Co., 141 Ohio St. 303, 47 N. E. 2d 983 (1943); which approved
and followed the rule laid down prior to the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act in Baker v. Kinsey, supra. It should be noted
that the Negotiable Instruments Act makes no mention of set-off
and, further, that the majority of jurisdictions deny the right of
set-off under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. Lincoln v.
Grant, 47 App. D. C. 475 (1918); Stegal v. Union Bank & Federal
Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 176 S. E. 438 (1934).
The only basis the court gives for its decision is the rule an-
nounced in Osborn v. McClelland, supra, which was decided prior to
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and justifies its
action in so doing by pointing out the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in the Union Properties case, supra, which adhered to the
older rule regarding set-off.
It is submitted that from the allowance of a set-off in one case,
it does not necessarily follow that a real party in interest defense
should be allowed to stand against an endorsee of a note in pos-
session. It would seem more desirable that the courts follow the
majority rulings; thus realizing the objective of the Negotiable
Instruments Act-uniformity.
Harrison Comstock
NoN-PROFIT CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO INSPECT BooKs
Plaintiff, a member of defendant non-profit corporation, sought
to inspect the books of the defendant. Defendant contended that
Section 8623-63 of the Ohio General Code restricts this right to
shareholders of corporations for profit. Held, that a member of a
non-profit corporation has the right to inspect the corporate books.
Bolman v. Automotive Workers Building Corp., Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Lucas County, Ohio, No. 172025 (unreported, 1949);
affirmed, Court of Appeals, Lucas County, Ohio, No. 4442 (un-
reported, 1950); motion to certify denied, June 21, 1950.
This is the first decision of the question under the Ohio General
Corporation Act. Although the Supreme Court denied the motion
to certify, the opinion of the Common Pleas Court contains a thor-
ough and comprehensive review of the authorities on inspection of
corporate books.
At common law the right of a member to inspect the books of
a non-profit corporation was well settled, Matter of Steinway, 159
N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899), and this right apparently existed
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without regard to whether a shareholder or only a member was
concerned. Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 246 M. 170, 92 N.E. 643
(1910); 38 C. J. 794. The test is not whether the interest of the
party is evidenced by a certificate of stock or of membership, but
is whether his interest in the corporation is one which the law will
protect. If such an interest appears, the right of inspection is
granted to members of non-profit corporations. State ex rel Haeusler
v. German Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 Mo. App. 354, 152 S.W. 618
(1912); McClintock v. Young Republicans of Philadelphia, 210 Pa.
115, 59 Atl. 691 (1904).
Prior to the principal case there was doubt whether the Ohio
General Corporation Act had changed the common law. Section
8623-63 provides, ". . . every corporation shall keep . .. the books
of account, lists of shareholders ... records of issuance and transfer
of shares ... and the minutes of meetings of every corporation shall
be open to the inspection of every shareholder at all reasonable
times save and except for unreasonable or improper purposes."
(Emphasis supplied) Section 8623-63 does not mention corporations
not for profit. It speaks of shares and the rights of shareholders
to inspect, but is silent concerning rights of members of non-profit
corporations.
There has been one Ohio case on the question. Ohio Humane
Society v. Biles, 11 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 384 (1908). This case con-
strued Section 3254 REV. STAT., which provided, "The books and rec-
ords of such corporations shall at all reasonable times be open to the
inspection of every shareholder." The syllabus in the Biles case
reads, "The provision found in Section 3254 REv. STAT. requiring
that the books and records of corporations shall be open to the in-
spection of stockholders at all reasonable times, has no reference to
corporations not for profit." The court held that Section 3254 did not
apply to non-profit corporations because such words as stock and
stockholder plainly indicated a legislative intent to confine the appli-
cation of the section to corporations for profit. Although the same
reasoning could be applied to Section 8623-63, the court in the prin-
cipal case rejected such a narrow construction by interpreting the
section in light of the common law. Courts in other jurisdictions
have generally reached the same conclusion on the subject. The
courts of New York have held that there is an inherent power, apart
from the unaffected by particular statutory provisions, to order a
disclosure of corporate books and records to a petitioning share-
holder. David v. Sillcox, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (1946). The court in the
principal case made use of the Sillcox case because the Ohio Cor-
poration Committee in drafting the Ohio General Corporation Act
relating to non-profit corporations gave considerable attention to
the membership corporation law of New York, and to similar
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statutes in the states of Maryland, Illinois, and Michigan. 1 DAVIEs,
Omno CORPORATION LAW 1098 (1942).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a shareholder's
right to inspect the corporate books is a right that exists inde-
pendently of statute. Where the statute is silent as to the right or
fails to provide that the statutory rule shall be exclusive, the com-
mon law rule remains in effect. State ex rel Gustafson Co. v. Crook-
ston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W. 2d 911 (1946). Other courts
have gone further and held that statutes giving the right of inspec-
tion do not restrict the common law right, but enlarge and extend
it by removing some of the common law limitations. Guthrie v.
Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Matter of Steinway, supra.
The Minnesota court considered the question presented in the
principal case when deciding State ex rel Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk
Assn., 200 Minn. 1, 273 N.W. 603 (1937). The statute involved
there provided for the right of inspection with reference to stock
corporations only. The court held, however, that the purpose of the
statute was not to restrict the common law right, that the policy
underlying the rule as to stock corporations applies equally to non-
profit corporations, and that, therefore, the right of inspection
applies to non-profit corporations.
In all these case, the familiar rule of construction that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed was
employed to maintain the right of inspection for members of non-
profit corporations where the right was not specifically provided
for by statute. Thus, it can be seen that the construction placed
upon Section 8623-63 by the court in the principal case is in line
with case authority in other jurisdictions.
The court in the principal case also held that in view of the
fact that the Act refers to every corporation, non-profit corporations
are subject to its provisions. As a second basis for its decision the
court referred to the inherent common law right of members as well
as shareholders to inspect the corporate books. In dictum the court
stated that this right could not be abridged or supplanted even by
statute. This goes further than other courts have yet gone, the
common view, as evidenced by the Gustafson case, supra, being that
these statutes merely affirm the common law unless they expressly
deny the right or provide that the rights given are exclusive of
any other.
Robert R. Freda
PLEADING-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CONTRACT AND BODILY INJURY
-APPLICABLE STATUTE DETERMINED By CARmAcTER OF INJURY
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for injuries
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received while he was a passenger on one of defendant's buses which
struck a viaduct pillar. Defendant's demurrers to both the original
petition and to an amended petition were sustained upon the ground
that plaintiff's action was one for bodily injury and therefore barred
by the two year period of limitation of Section 11224-1, Ohio General
Code. The court of appeals, in reversing the trial court, took the
position that this was an action grounded on an alleged breach of
the implied contract of a carrier to transport a passenger safely to
his destination and therefore the six year limitation of Section
11222, Ohio General Code, controls. On appeal, held, regardless of
whether the action sounds in tort or contract, it is nevertheless
an action to recover damages for bodily injury and is governed
by the two year limitation prescribed by Section 11224-1. Andrianos
v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E. 2d 549 (1951).
It seems well settled that where a common carrier agrees, for
consideration, to carry a passenger over its road, and by its negli-
gence an injury results to a passenger, he may at his election sue
upon the contract or in tort. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. v. Amos, 85 Ohio
St. 300, 97 N.E. 978 (1912); Cincinnati L & A Elec. Rd. v. Lohe,
68 Ohio St. 101, 67 N.E. 161 (1903); Pa. Ry. Co. v. Peoples, 31 Ohio
St. 537 (1877); 10 Am. JuR. 346.
While it is true that a choice of remedies lies with the plaintiff
enabling him to bring his action either upon the theory of tort or
contract, it does not follow that plaintiff's right of election as to
the form of his action thereby empowers him to make a particular
statute of limitations applicable. A physician who negligently treats
a patient is a tort-feasor, but he has also usually committed a breach
of a contractual duty to use due care. Nevertheless, an action by
the patient for malpractice, even though brought on a contract
theory, is subject to the one-year limitation for malpractice imposed
by Section 11225, Ohio General Code. Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St.
361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E.
865 (1902); Arend v. Mylander, 39 Ohio App. 277, 177 N.E. 377
(1931). Likewise assault and battery is usually "an injury to the
body," but it is nevertheless subject to the one-year limitation for
assault and battery imposed by Section 11225, rather than the two
year limitation.of Section 11224-1. Sousa v. Schultz, 8 Ohio L. Abs.
357 (Ct. of App. 1930).
In Kirchner v. Smith, 7 O.C.C. (N.S.) 22, 18 O.C.D. 45 (1905),
the court held that when property is unlawfully converted the plain-
tiff can waive the tort, sue in contract and thus come under the
longer statute of limitations. The tort statute of limitation, Sec-
tion 4982, of the Revised Statutes, had no specific provision for
conversion, but contained the same provision as subsection 4 of
Section 11224, which provides: "4. For an injury to the rights
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of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor hereinafter enumerated."
The Kirchner case should not be affected by the decision of the
principal case. There is no specific statute limiting an action for
conversion as in the case of an action for bodily injury. In the
absence of an applicable, special statute, "injuries arising on con-
tract" will continue to be subject to the six year limitation of
Section 11222. Discussions of the limitation applicable where a
benefit has been conferred upon the defendant may be found in
Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L. J. 221
(1910) and the reply by House, Unjust Enrichments The Applicable
Statute of Limitations, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 797 (1950).
The pertinent statutes considered in the principal case are
Section 11222, which provides: "An action upon a contract not in
writing, express or implied... shall be brought within six years
after the cause thereof accrued," and Section 11223-1, which pro-
vides: "An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property
shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose."
It is well established in Ohio that a special statutory provision
which relates to the specific subject matter involved in litigation is
controlling over a general statutory provision which might otherwise
be applicable. Acme Engineering Co. v. Jones, Admr., BUC, 150
Ohio St. 423, 83 N.E. 2d 202 (1948); State, ex rel. Elliot Co. v.
Connar, Supt. of Public Works, 123 Ohio St. 310, 175 N.E. 200
(1931); State, ex rel. Steller et al., Trustees v. Zangerle, Auditor,
100 Ohio St. 414, 126 N.E. 413 (1919); 37 0. JuR., 409. In the prin-
cipal case the court applied this principle to the foregoing statutes
and concluded that Section 11224-1 was controlling over Section
11222.
The majority rule is stated in 157 A.L.R. 766 as follows: "The
weight of authority is to the general effect that where a statute
limits the time within which an action for 'injuries to the person'
may be brought, the statute is applicable to all actions the real
purpose of which is to recover for an injury to the person, whether
based upon contract or tort, in preference to a general statute limit-
ing the time for bringing actions ex contractu." To the same general
effect, see: 34 Am. JuR. 84; 53 C.J.S., 1042.
Suporting this view are the following decisions which construe
statutes similar in import to Sections 11222 and 11224-1 of the
Ohio General Code: Vandevoir v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines,
152 F. 2d 150 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 237 U.S. 789 (construing
Kentucky statute); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Reed, 223 F. 689
(6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 640 (construing Indiana
statute); Handtoffski v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 274 Ill. 282,
113 N.E. 620 (1916); Coates v. Milner Hotel, 311 Mich. 233, 18 N.W.
2d 389 (1945); Loehr v. East Side Omnibus Co., 18 N.Y.S. 2d 529
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(S. Ct. App. Div., 1st Dept. 1940); Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc.,
355 Pa. 242, 49 A. 2d 379 (1946).
It has been suggested that if the unsatisfactory nature of the
evidence required to prove the extent of personal injury can be
considered the primary factor motivating the shorter limitation, then
the form of the remedy chosen should not affect the period of
limitation. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation,
63 HAnv. L. REv. 1177, 1194 (1950).
The General Assembly made no attempt to classify actions to
which Section 11224-1 should apply upon the basis of the remedy
chosen. By the explicit terms of the statute it classified them as
"actions for bodily injury" which, it seems, should apply to any
action the real purpose of which is to recover for personal injury.
In the principal case the plaintiff's bodily injuries are the true basis
of his actions. Regardless of which remedy he chooses, in order to
recover he must prove that the defendant's negligence caused his
injuries. The gist of the action is the wrongful injury. Surely the
General Assembly would have worded Section 11224-1 differently
had it intended that its applicability should depend upon the form
of the remedy chosen.
Derl D. Oberlin
TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIms AcT-AcTIONs
UNmER By SERVICEMEN
During 1949 the federal courts of appeals decided three cases
involving tort claims brought by servicemen against the United
States.
In the first case, plaintiff's decedent, an army officer on active
duty, was killed in the fire of his barracks. Action was brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §921 et seq. (1946),
as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§1346 (b), 2671-2680 (Supp. 1950), for
alleged negligence in quartering decedent in a barracks made unsafe
by a defective heating system. Action dismissed by the district
court. On appeal, affirmed. Feres v. United States, 177 F. 2d 535
(2d Cir. 1949).
In the second case, plaintiff, a soldier, while on active duty
underwent an operation by an army surgeon. Action was brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for alleged negligence in leav-
ing a towel in plaintiff's stomach. The district court found negli-
gence as a fact but dismissed the action on the ground that the Act
does not charge the United States with liability. Affirmed on appeal.
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F. 2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
In the third case, action was brought by the executrix under
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the Federal Tort Claims Act for the death of an army officer re-
sulting from alleged negligent medical treatment of army surgeons
rendered while decedent was on active duty. The district court
dismissed the action. On appeal, reversed. The complaint stated
a cause of action under the Act. Griggs v. United States, 178 F 2d 1
(10th Cir. 1949).
The Supreme Court in reviewing the three cases in one opinion
affirmed the judgments in the Feres and Jefferson cases and re-
versed that in the Griggs case. Held, the United States is not liable
under the Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Feres v.
United States, 71 Sup. Ct. 153 (1950).
With the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act Congress
waived sovereign immunity for tort claims. The Act provides:
". .. the district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, ...
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government. .. ." 28 U. S. C. §1346 (b) (Supp. 1950). Although
the Act as originally proposed contained an express exception as
regards claims of servicemen, H. R. REP'. No. 181, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945), it was not included among the twelve express
exceptions as finally adopted.
In an action by a soldier for injuries received while on active
duty but on furlough in a collision with a negligently operated
government truck, the court of appeals read into the Act an implied
exception of members of the armed forces as a class and denied
the claim. United States v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948),
Note, 10 OHio ST. L.J. 106 (1949). Overruled on appeal. The
Supreme Court allowed the claim and expressly rejected such an
implied exception, "'Any claim' could not be read to mean 'any
claim but that of servicemen.'" Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949), and the Supreme Court further rejected the election of
remedy predicate which had been used to deny tort claims of serv-
icemen under the Public Vessels Act, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46
U.S.C. §781 et seq. (1946). Dobson v. United States, 27 F. 2d 807
(2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 653 (1929). Bradley v. United
States, 151 F. 2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795
(1946). But the Supreme Court in the Brooks case, supra, carefully
limited their holding to claims for injuries not incident to service;
"Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly differ-
ent case would be presented. We express no opinion as to it...."
The principal case purports to answer this question, but in
the face of the reasoning in the Brooks case and the canons of
legislative interpretation, the Court is hard pressed to establish its
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position. The Court lays the premise that "the primary purpose of
the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without,"
because of the bar of sovereign immunity, and "not to visit the
Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities." Since the
Court can find "no American law which ever has permitted a soldier
to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or
the government he is serving," it believes that allowing such claims
would create an unprecedented liability and hence is not within the
legislative intent. It would seem that the Court is thus applying
a basis for denying claims of servicemen which it expressly dis-
claimed in the Brooks case, i.e., exclusion of servicemen as a class.
While few can differ with the ultimate decision denying tort
claims for service connected injuries in view of the liberal com-
pensation dispensed to servicemen, it would seem that a better
basis for implying the exception could be obtained from an analogy
to workmen's compensation laws which provide the sole ground of
liability for injuries received in the course of employment but do
not preclude tort actions against the employer for injuries received
outside of the employment relationship.
Thomas T. Taggart
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